Holography suggests a considerable reduction of degrees of freedom in theories with gravity. However it seems to be difficult to understand how holography could be realized in a closed re-contracting universe. In this letter we claim that a scenario which achieves that goal will eliminate all spatial degrees of freedom. This would require a different concept of quantum mechanics and would imply an intriguing increase of power for the natural laws.
Introduction
Recently the concept of holography attracted much attention. Motivated primarily by the area law of black hole entropy the idea is that any theory involving gravity can be fully described by a theory without gravity on the boundary, where the number of information quanta is one per Planck area on the boundary [1] . The relevance of this holographic principle is supported by the concept of matrix theory [2] which suggests a holographic nature and even more so by the discovery of a duality between string theory on AdS space and a conformal super Yang Mills theory on its boundary [3] .
In this letter we want to deal with two general questions that arise in the context of holography. The first question is how holography can be realized in a closed re-contracting universe.
As it was argued in [7] , a straightforward estimate of the entropy in a closed universe is irreconcilable with a holographic limit for the number of degrees of freedom. To make holography consistent with a closed re-contracting universe, rather radical changes in the understanding of the situation seem to be necessary.
The second question is an even more fundamental one. It asks about the meaning of the notion of degree of freedom in principle, a question that is raised by the advent of holography.
The classical paradigm behind the notion of physical degrees of freedom is the following: There exist physical laws which uniquely define the timely evolution of some initial state. The space-like situation of this initial state is in principle unconstrained. The number of degrees of freedom of a physical system denotes the number of possibilities to construct that initial state. In a quantized framework this picture is slightly modified since the time-like determinism is reduced by the uncertainty relation. However the basic conception of degrees of freedom as a consequence of space-like freedom in contrast to time-like determinism remains the same.
A holographic principle makes this distinction between determined and "free" directions more problematic. It claims that the number of dimensions spanning the space of degrees of freedom is not directly connected to the number of space-like dimensions. In some sense the physical theory that determines time-like evolution is also able to reduce the freedom of choice of a space-like initial state. Having started out in this direction, one could question the concept of degree of freedom altogether. If a physical theory is able to abolish some of the spatial degrees of freedom, why not all of them? Physical theories underwent a remarkable evolution so far. While classical mechanics is merely a tool to describe and predict the kinematics of given objects in a given space, today's string theory tries to explain uniquely all qualitative features of the universe like types of particles and forces, number of dimensions, etc. It seems to be the natural next step to aim at uniquely prescribing as well the individual spatial localization of the objects that fill the universe. One can argue that a theory of the world only deserves its name if the local spatial structure of this world is part of the theory. We will call a theory that achieves that goal spatially unique.
In this letter we claim that the two questions described above are connected: The holographic principle seems to imply spatial uniqueness in the case of a closed re-contracting universe. In section two we give a simple toy-example of a spatially unique world. This example serves merely as an illustration and is not an essential part of the main discussion. The reader who is not interested in it can skip it without loosing the argument. Section three discusses the basic arguments that suggest spatial uniqueness in a realistic cosmological setting. Section four speculates on how quantum mechanics would have to change in this framework. We end with conclusions.
A very simple example
At first sight the quest for a spatially unique theory might seem to be a rather over-ambitious one. However, in this chapter we want to argue that even at a purely classical level it is not out of reach. The property we need is naturally present in the currently much discussed AdS space, though not too much appreciated there: A closed time dimension. The discussions of AdS usually use the universal covering space to avoid this property. In the context of our discussion it will be very useful.
We assume a classical toy universe with a rigid space-time characterized by a 2-dimensional space-like sphere of radius R and a compactified time dimension.
1 In this space-time we assume a large number n of ideally elastic distinguishable balls with average diameter d and average mass m which move around with a certain total energy and bounce into each other. We only count balls which interact at least indirectly with the main group of balls. Single balls or interacting subsets of balls which do not interact with any ball of the largest interacting subset are invisible and therefore ignored.
Each phase space constellation of the n balls is considered one microstate. We formally treat the number of microstates as a finite number and eventually send it to infinity. Our model satisfies a time-like boundary condition F (t = 0) = F (t = T ) with F (t) being the microstate of the system at time t and T being the length of the time dimension. We want to estimate how many initial microstates exist for a given T which are consistent with this condition. To be able to do so we have to find scenarios where the number of consistent initial microstates is still controlled by statistics. This is not the case if there exists any subset of microstates whose histories are considerably less complex than the genuine system. Statistics of the whole system would be blind against an increased number of consistent initial states among those microstates. The basis for the formation of a less complex subset is some symmetry that splits the system into smaller parts. Three types of less complex histories can result: a) States that return to the initial state after a fraction of the prescribed time; b) states whose histories always remain in a lower dimensional subspace; and c) states that can be split into smaller identical sub-ensembles with identical histories. a) can be excluded by defining the closed time length as the time up to the first reappearance of the same microstate. Using that definition histories that return after a fraction of that time are no solution for the chosen time length any more and don't count.
b) can be excluded by taking nd > 2πR. In that case the system does not fit into a lower dimensional subspace.
c) can be excluded by making n a prime number. In that case sub-ensembles can only exist if the whole system lives in one dimension which has already been excluded above.
There obviously exists a direct connection between an initial microstate and its time inverted state. If one is a consistent initial state, the other is as well, without telling anything new since we do not have a global time arrow. We will therefore count pairs of initial microstates which are the time inverted of each other and ask how many pairs are consistent initial states.
2 .
Now we can start counting: Our system is characterized by a set G of 2N possible microstates F i at time t = 0 (a set G ′ of N states plus the N time inverted states). Each of those microstates develops into some state of the same set G at the time t = T . Since we considered a finite space, we can take the time period between t = 0 and t = T sufficiently long to allow the assumption that each of the states in G can be realized with the same probability at the time T . Now, as explained above, we forget about the time inverted half of our states. Statistically the probability for one microstate of our set G ′ of N states to satisfy
The average number of states F i of G ′ for which F (t = 0) = F i = F (t = T ) is one. The probability that there exist exactly n microstates that fulfill the condition above is
The probability that exactly one microstate meets the condition therefore is
This means that with considerable probability there are no degrees of freedom in such world. The described model is spatially unique for a large fraction of choices for the parameters of our model.
An important question is whether our toy model can reproduce the second law of thermodynamics at least locally. To discuss this we have to assume that the initial state has low entropy. Genuinely this is a highly improbable assumption, however it is necessary for comparing our toy model with more realistic scenarios. One could formulate the assumption the following way: We have, depending on the parameters T, N, E/m, R/d and the individual diameters and masses of the balls, an infinite number of possible universes. We select the small subgroup of them, whose single closed history passes through a low entropy state. Now we want to discuss how a genuine closed history of a universe in this subgroup would look like. We look at the universe at a certain time T 1 << T . One can assume that the decoupling of the boundary condition, i.e. the principle that any state at T can be reached from T 1 with the same probability is still valid. Therefore though the system is not a truly statistical system, up to T 1 it will genuinely behave like a thermodynamical system, because the same statistical arguments that select the correct macrostate in a thermodynamical system also define the probabilities for the one path that leads back to its initial state to sit in some macrostate at T 1 . It is simply much more probable that the "right" path is one of the many in the thermodynamically favoured macrostate than one of the few in some low entropy macrostate.
The argument does not hold any more if the time period between T 1 and T is too small since in that case it becomes more unlikely for microstates far away from the initial state to be able to return. The assumption of the same probability for all microstates is not valid any more. Since we do not have a global time arrow, the whole argument described above holds for an inverted time axis as well. Therefore one would naturally expect that the universe evolves according to the second law of thermodynamics during its earlier phase and increasingly deviates from that path while approaching the point t = T /2. 3 The fundamental laws of thermodynamics are viable only in the first phase. In the middle phase of the universe the "tendency" towards the initial state becomes stronger and entirely destroys the statistical principle. The third phase of the universe shows an inverted entropy law and a negative time arrow like it was proposed in a cosmological setting in [4] , [5] (withdrawn in [6] ) and [9] in a cosmological setting.
Cosmology
So far we have just discussed a simple toy universe to show that spatial uniqueness is nothing absurd in principle. To make contact with the real world it is necessary to introduce something like a compactified time dimension into a realistic cosmological scenario.
A closed time can only exist in a re-contracting universe since a universe that expands for ever obviously does not allow an identification of different points in time. T must be identified with the time period between big bang and big crunch. There exist two pure types of spatially homogeneous re-contracting universes. The first achieves re-contraction via a negative cosmological constant. This is the Anti DeSitter universe which has infinite spatial extension. And the second is a closed universe with an over-critical mass content. This second case is interesting for our purposes. From now on "closed universe" will always denote a closed re-contracting universe.
At this point we come back to the holographic conjecture. In spaces other than AdS it is not clear how a geometric picture of holography should look like since there is no nice notion of a boundary of space. In [7] it was proposed to identify the boundary with the horizon of the universe. In that case the question whether or not a holographic information bound is obeyed for all time is decided by a race between the expansion of the universe (that decreases the entropy density) and the expansion of the horizon (that decreases the ratio between the horizon area and the volume it encloses). It was estimated that holography according to that formulation is in principle consistent with the evolution of entropy in an open universe.
However it fails in a closed universe provided one accepts the conventional identification between entropy and degrees of freedom as well as a "thermodynamic" behaviour of the universe throughout all times. Now these are exactly the principles we were ready to abolish to gain spatial uniqueness.
In the following we will not adopt the formulation of holography used in [7] . We will just start with a very fundamental requirement that seems to be necessary for holography to make sense: If holography is true, the number of possible microstates when the universe has the size of the Planck length is one. This has to be the case coming from the big bang as well as going into the big crunch. A holographic principle that does not enforce that condition would have to use some "boundary" beyond the actual spatial realization of the universe and therefore would loose its original meaning. If we accept this condition, a holographic closed universe somewhat resembles a scenario with a closed time dimension. One could formally make the identification by gluing together its Planck-scale sized ends.
It is interesting to note that the time-symmetric boundary conditions enforced by holography show up as well if one tries to formulate a low entropy boundary condition for the wave function of the universe [8] . The wave function of the universe can be formulated as the functional integral
where K is a normalization factor, S E is the classical gravity action and the integral sums over all four geometries that eventually end at a space-like boundary with the induced three metric h ij . Since time is part of the four-space that is varied in the variation principle above, different paths need different times to reach h ij which means that time cannot be used as a universal evolution parameter for Ψ. Consequently the state function of Ψ can only be formulated as a time independent Schroedinger equation, the Wheeler DeWitt equation
where H is the gravitational Hamiltonian. If we want to introduce boundary conditions for Ψ we cannot use time as a parameter. We have to use something connected directly to a specific space-like surface, e.g. the actual extension of the universe. This however means that the boundary conditions can only be imposed simultaneously for a certain extension in the expanding as well as the contracting phase. The boundary conditions must be timesymmetric [9] .
To come back to the consequences of holography, let us sketch how the evolution of the universe from minimal initial entropy can take place. This is nothing unusual and part of the the standard lore of cosmology. The universe starts from an initial quantum fluctuation which induces the initial minimal entropy state. An inflationary period blows up the universe exponentially and after re-heating the universe is in a state of rather high entropy mainly carried by the photons in thermal equilibrium. From there on entropy is increased by gravitational clumping due to small initial density variations. Eventually this gravitational clumping will lead to the formation of black holes which carry an entropy per baryon that is much higher than the photon/baryon ratio. Therefore, if the universe would behave statistically throughout its evolution, black holes would dominate the entropy in the later contracting phase of the universe.
Now the next question is, what must happen to return to the minimal entropy at the final state. We have to note that the situation differs fundamentally from the situation in our classical toy model. There we had the choice to pick exactly the right microstate at t = 0 and we found that there is approximately one such state. Now we have only one possible initial microstate. Why should this state lead back to itself at t = T ? Let us consider the number of microstates at t = T /2. If our system would be classically deterministic, we could go back in time and be sure to find always exactly one microstate that is causally connected to each state at t = T /2. The number of microstates would be constant. In our universe however this is not the case and the reason lies in its quantum nature. In a universe that initially has just one microstate the whole richness of possibilities emanates from quantum fluctuations. Imagine the universe measures itself at t = T /2 to be in a specific state. This means that the chain of factual quantum effects has led to this state while all the other states are non-factual hypothetical results of all possible quantum "decisions" up to that time. Consequently if we want to translate the principle of the toy model into a realistic scenario, we have to replace the classical probabilities for specific initial states entirely with quantum probabilities for specific quantum decisions during the evolution of the universe. The boundary conditions imposed by holography act as "teleological" hidden parameters that determine quantum decisions and guide the way back to the initial state.
Now we come to the crucial argument for spatial uniqueness. The maximal possible entropy of the universe we can see respectively feel today, realized if all matter ends up concentrated in a single black hole, would be
Therefore the finetuning of the universe to reach minimal entropy in the big crunch is higher than exp(−10 123 ). This represents an immensely specific selection of paths from the set of paths allowed by conventional quantum mechanics. This extreme selectivity will have a strong impact on the character of local quantum decisions. A specific outcome of a measurement that would be perfectly probable according to quantum statistics at that time could well imply extremely improbable future quantum decisions in order to find its way back to the holographically determined final state and therefore be virtually excluded. The plausibility of a specific quantum decision at a certain time is determined not only by some wave function at that time but by all future "probabilities" the state has to go through to reach the final state. Thus it is impossible to keep the interpretation of the wave function as something connected to a probability density for a specific outcome of a measurement at a certain time.
The only way to keep a probability interpretation of the wave function would be to integrate over the probabilities of a whole measured path 4 throughout the evolution of the universe and understand the integrated probability as the probability for the physical reality of a certain measured evolution of the universe. However, since there is just one universe, there is no way to understand the meaning of statistics in that context. Statistics only makes sense if it is applied to a large set of events. It is definitely meaningless to keep a statistic principle if its validity is reduced to one single event at all, namely the overall form of the universe 5 . Using a statistical explanation for the quantum-dynamics of the universe in this case is indistinguishable from not giving any explanation at all. Therefore the only way to avoid loosing all control over the dynamics of the universe is to postulate a mechanism that chooses unambiguously one measured path. This however, following the arguments above, picks uniquely one spatial distribution at each point in time, in other words it means spatial uniqueness.
We started off by demanding holography for a closed universe and we ended up abolishing all spatial degrees of freedom. How does this fit into a geometrical picture and how can it be compared to the AdS case? Holography on AdS relies on two basic properties: 1) There are no Cauchy surfaces in AdS. In other words physics on AdS does not entirely emanate from an initial state at a time t = 0 but always gets new input from the boundary. 2) There is the nonlocal character of observables in gravity. This enforces a situation where the boundary defines physics in the bulk entirely. 4 It is important to distinguish the measured path from a trajectory in the path integral. We assume that the universe continuously measures itself through self interaction and therefore makes a continuous chain of quantum decisions that define its state at each stage modulo the fundamental quantum uncertainty. An evolution of the universe defined by this chain of measurements we call a measured path. 5 This does not change at all if one uses the notion of Everett branching. There is no philosophically sound way to define a statistical principle that covers a set of non-interacting parallel universes.
In the case of a closed universe we have again two basic properties. 1) Cauchy surfaces do exist. Thus the whole evolution of the universe emanates from an initial state. 2) We have seen that gravity, if holographic, uniquely determines the initial state and its evolution. This is to some extent reminiscent of the AdS case: An initial state in the bulk does not contribute to the number of degrees of freedom of the system. But, because of 1) it is more than that: It implies spatial uniqueness. This is also reflected in the geometric picture of a boundary on which all information of the enclosed space can be stored. If one encloses some space inside a boundary and then maximizes this space, in a closed universe the boundary will shrink to a point and therefore the information capacity there will be reduced to zero.
We do not see how this type of argument could be adapted to tell anything new about holography in eternally expanding universes.
Prospects and problems of a new quantum principle
We do not have a specific proposal for a deterministic principle that could lead to a phenomenologically reasonable world. In this section we will just discuss some basic properties which should be realized in such a concept and mention some important problems.
The essential character of the required quantum principle must be the following: On one side it has to abolish the statistical nature of quantum mechanics to satisfy the holographic bound. But on the other side it has to keep the uncertainty principle to allow an increase of "possible" microstates during the evolution of the universe. This might look rather strange at first sight, however there is no contradiction in it. While the uncertainty principle is a direct implication of the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics, rooted in the non-commutativity of conjugate operators, the identification of the wave function with the square root of a probability density represents an additional interpretative step. While the mathematical description remains at the level of wave mechanics, the probability interpretation is based on the introduction of an additional selection principle, in the Copenhagen interpretation the concept of contraction of the wave function in an experiment. Of course the statistical interpretation of the wave function is well founded in our observation of the world, however there is no reason to believe that this statistical interpretation cannot be replaced by some new principle that achieves the same phenomenology up to our stage of the universe. Due to their "teleological" nature the hidden parameters that select the measured path are surely nonlocal and do not violate Bell's inequalities. The world is totally deterministic but not exactly well defined, there remains a core of uncertainty of observables that is irreducible by experiment.
The most natural approach towards a quantum principle of the described type would be to define a pseudo-classical action principle that exactly chooses the measured path with the highest over all "probability". The word "probability" in this context is just used for traditional reasons but has lost its original meaning, therefore it is set under quote. Obviously this approach would be impossible in a world without a final boundary condition. It would force each quantum decision towards the most probable outcome and therefore could not provide the observed statistical character of the quantum world. In a closed universe however the boundary conditions enforce local decisions of various "probabilities". Nevertheless it is not easy to imagine how a realistic phenomenology could be realized. There exist two fundamental problems: How can an action principle lead to a quantum statistics whose distribution is controlled exactly by the square of the wave function and not by the wave function to some arbitrary power. And why does the selected path lead to a universe that is not ideally isotropic but shows the observed density perturbations. Even if a scenario could answer those two questions, probably it would still have to fix a certain maximal extension of the universe as an additional boundary condition (analog to the fixing of a certain duration T in the classical case). Otherwise the highest "probability" solution should always be the trivial case of non-existence.
What follows are some short remarks on other sensitive points. The T-invariant character of the universe in the discussed scenario requires a T-invariant conception of quantum mechanical measurement that is not realized in the conventional chronological concept of the contraction of the wave function. There exists a formulation of quantum mechanics without a time arrow [10, 11] that can be applied to our framework.
A second remark concerns the return to the same microstate that is required in our framework. According to [11] in a world where gravitational effects can be neglected and decoherence is exactly realized, no nontrivial history leads back to its initial state. In our case however in the crucial early and late phases of the universe both conditions are not fulfilled and the argument does not apply.
Another question is whether the effects of a symmetric re-contracting universe should have been seen in experiments. In fact there exists an experimental result [12] that excludes a closed time-symmetric universe based on the would-be-effects of symmetric propagation of star light, provided there exist no "unnatural conspiring relations" that could hide this effect. However, as remarked in several works that consider time-symmetric universes (see e.g. [9] ), such unnatural conspiring relations that could e.g. enhance photon scattering and tune its direction in a middle phase of the universe in any case constitute an essential part of a time-symmetric universe scenario. Therefore it seems very difficult to make any real statement based on experiment in that respect.
Finally one has to say that the closed universe scenario has lost some of its appeal recently because of measurements of distant supernovae which hint towards an open universe with a positive cosmological constant [13] . Still it is probably too early to draw final theoretical conclusions from those measurements.
Conclusion
In this letter we tried to make plausible that a holographic nature of the universe seems to imply spatial uniqueness if the universe is closed. It remains to be seen whether the required quantum principles can be formulated in an exact way and can in fact reproduce the quantum phenomena and gravitational phenomena of our observed world. However we want to emphasize once more that the consequences of finding a realistic scenario of that type would be enormously gratifying.
A highly attractive picture would emerge. The model would eliminate the indeterminism of quantum mechanics without local hidden parameters. It would avoid the problematic notion of increasing entropy in a contracting universe. And finally it would establish spatial uniqueness as a defining condition of the world. While the qualitative features and the evolution in time with all its parameters could be uniquely prescribed by some M-, or other theory, the fact that the universe is closed together with the holographic principle would uniquely prescribe the world's concrete realization in space. The notion of reality in the world would be reduced to the notion of reality of the natural laws.
Seen in this light the obstacles against reconciling holography with a closed universe in a conventional way can be understood as a hint towards a role of the physical laws that is much more powerful than it is estimated today.
